The Battle of Poltava

The Battle of Poltava, fought on June 28, 1709, was a decisive conflict during the Great Northern War between Sweden, led by King Charles XII, and Russia, under Tsar Peter the Great. This battle marked a turning point, as the Swedish forces suffered a crushing defeat, effectively ending Sweden’s status as a major European power. The victory established Russia as a dominant force in Eastern Europe and paved the way for Peter the Great’s ambitious reforms and territorial expansion. The Battle of Poltava is often considered one of the most significant battles in Russian history.

Poltava: Sweden’s Fall, Russia’s Rise

Introduction

The Battle of Poltava in 1709 marked a turning point in military history—the moment when the dominant force on the battlefield shifted from edged weapons driven by human muscle, such as swords, spears, and arrows, to cannons and guns using gunpowder to propel bullets, shells, or cannonballs. One of the main agents for this transformation came from a perhaps unexpected quarter: the rather obscure kingdom of Sweden.

Military Innovations in Sweden

• (1) In 1611, 17-year-old Gustavus Adolphus ascended to the throne of Sweden. He proved to be a farsighted military genius, radically restructuring the Swedish army around the principles of firepower and mobility. He introduced a new, much lighter musket and reversed the percentage of his infantry who carried guns versus those who wielded pikes, for the first time making guns the primary weapon of an army.
• (2) Gustavus equipped the Swedish army with three standard-size cannons, emphasizing light cannons that could be drawn by a few horses and deployed in accordance with troop movements on the battlefield. Cavalry were used as shock troops, and soldiers were organized into regiments.
• (3) Using his new, modern army, Gustavus embarked on a series of spectacularly successful campaigns and turned Sweden into the most powerful state in northern Europe. By the late 1600s, Sweden dominated Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea and had acquired footholds in Germany that allowed it to control commerce on three of Germany’s major rivers.

The Opponents

• (1) In 1697, 15-year-old Charles XII came to the throne. Sweden’s chief victims over the previous century—Denmark, Poland, and Russia—sensed an opportunity to take advantage of the inexperience and youth of the new monarch. The result was the Great Northern War: Denmark invaded Schleswig-Holstein, Poland attacked Riga, and the Russians invaded Livonia.
• (2) Unfortunately for them, Charles XII turned out to be a military leader fully as talented as his ancestors. Now 18, he personally led the Swedish army in a counterattack, first defeating Denmark, then the Russians, and finally embarking on a brilliant campaign in Poland that lasted several years and produced at least six major victories.
• (3) Charles XII’s personal role model was Alexander the Great. Well aware that Alexander had conquered a vast eastern empire with a relatively small army, Charles was now determined to invade Russia and capture Moscow. The army with which Charles proposed to do this numbered around 40,000. On September 7, 1707, Charles and his forces crossed the Oder River into Poland.
• (4) His opponent was another young, determined ruler: Peter I of Russia, who came to the throne determined to change Russia’s feudal economic and social structure. He was fascinated by technology and had traveled extensively in Western Europe, eagerly absorbing the most sophisticated cultural and scientific achievements of the age.
• (5) One of Peter’s desires was to make Russia a significant naval power, but he needed access to either the Baltic or the Crimean Sea, preferably both. The Swedes blocked his way in the north and the Turks, in the south.
• (6) At the time of Charles’s invasion, Peter had begun his modernization of the Russian army, probably most successful in the area of upgrading the army’s gunpowder weapons, from the common soldier’s musket up to heavy siege cannons. The Russian army was especially well-equipped with a large number of modern artillery pieces.

The Campaign

• (1) Peter adopted a strategy emulated during later invasions of Russia by Napoleon and Hitler. His army retreated before the advancing Swedes and enacted a policy of destroying farms, burning crops, and forcing the invaders to maintain long supply lines. Peter was also counting on one of Russia’s most potent defensive strengths: its long, terrible winters.
• (2) Peter’s other secret weapon was the vast size of Russia: He could afford to surrender huge chunks of territory, luring the Swedes farther from home, reinforcements, and supplies.
• (3) The Swedish army crossed the Vistula River in December 1707 and steadily progressed across Poland and into Lithuania before halting for the winter in February. The army moved forward again in June, and there were several skirmishes and minor battles with the Russians. Peter and his main army shadowed the Swedes but would not commit to a decisive battle, thus drawing Charles deeper into Russia.
• (4) The supply question was becoming critical, and Charles’s best bet seemed to be to turn south toward the Ukraine, although this would divert his march away from Moscow. When some Ukraine-based Cossack groups rebelled against Peter and offered to join Charles, also offering to feed his starving army, his decision to turn south was reinforced.
• (5) The winter of 1708–1709 turned out to be one of the coldest and harshest in memory. Charles’s army plodded forward, continuing the campaign through the winter. After several skirmishes with the Russians, it came to a stop on the main road from Kiev to Kharkov at a point between the Vorskla and Psiol rivers.
• (6) The Russians were encamped nearby, outside the small town of Poltava. Disease, combat, and the winter had whittled Charles’s army down to an effective fighting force of about 25,000 men. Not only was food running short, but the remaining store of gunpowder was limited and of questionable quality.
• (7) On June 17, Charles was inspecting his outposts along the Vorskla River when he was struck in the foot by a Russian musket ball. He was used to leading from the front in battle, personally directing charges and rousing his men with his example, but this injury was severe enough that he had to be carried in a litter at the Battle of Poltava, both limiting his mobility and depriving his men of his crucial inspiration.

The Battle

• (1) Peter entrenched his main army, about 25,000 infantry and 73 cannons, in a fortified camp backed against the Vorskla River, a few miles north of Poltava. To get at the camp, the Swedish army would have to pass through a gap between two dense woods to the southwest. Across this gap, Peter had erected a row of six redoubts: miniature rectangular or triangular earthen forts spaced at 150-meter intervals. He then built four more redoubts at a right angle to the first set.
• (2) Together, the redoubts formed a T and were manned by about 5,000 soldiers with 16 cannons. To attack the main Russian force, the Swedish army had to pass these small forts, which could pour fire into their vulnerable flanks. Peter positioned the majority of his cavalry, about 9,000 men, in a line behind the redoubts.
• (3) Charles’s plan for the battle seems daring, even foolhardy. His available resources were about 8,000 infantry, 7,000 cavalry, and four small cannons. He proposed to rush this small force past the lines of redoubts before dawn, then assault the main Russian camp.
• (4) Things began to go wrong almost at once. The infantry was supposed to lead, with the cavalry following close behind, but the two groups lost contact, and the infantry had to pause until the cavalry was located and brought forward, delaying the attack.
• (5) Worse, the Swedes were detected by the redoubts, which opened fire at point-blank range. The columms of Swedish infantry furthest away were able to stay focused and hurry past, but those closer to the redoubts became bogged down as the men returned fire.
• (6) Had the Swedish units continued moving forward after subduing the redoubts, they might have prevailed. But a group of six battalions, one-third of the entire Swedish infantry, under the command of General Roos, stopped altogether and became enmeshed in a brutal fight for control of the third redoubt.
• (7) Meanwhile, the remaining infantry and the cavalry forged past the redoubts onto the plain in front of the Russian camp. Charles’s forces had been badly mauled in passing the redoubts, but it seemed that they could proceed with the plan. Charles began to assemble and organize his forces in preparation for an assault on the main Russian camp. But he now realized that a third of his infantry was missing.
• (8) Roos had stubbornly continued to assault the third redoubt in a series of futile attacks. Having lost 40 percent of his men, he withdrew to a nearby wood, where the Russians pounced. After a running fight, Roos was isolated from the rest of the army and down to 20 percent of his original men. He surrendered.
• (9) Back out on the plain, every minute the Swedes delayed, they lost men to Russian cannon fire. Then, the Russians marched out and began to deploy in a line facing them. Now 22,000 fresh Russian troops began to march forward against the thin line of tired Swedish infantry, who numbered no more than 4,000.
• (10) The two lines began about 800 meters apart. As the range decreased to 500 meters, the massed Russian cannon opened fire, smashing gaps in the Swedish line. At 200 meters, the Russian cannons switched from solid balls to grapeshot and scrap metal that spewed a storm of lethal fragments into the Swedish ranks.
• (11) Finally, at 50 meters, the Russian infantry, four ranks deep, lowered their muskets and unleashed a colossal volley. All this time, the Swedish soldiers had marched forward without firing a single shot in return. Now, at a range of 30 meters, the survivors finally paused, discharged their muskets in one volley, and charged.
• (12) Astonishingly, on the Swedish right, the thin, ragged line of infantry actually began to force back the thicker Russian formation. On the left, however, the line began to falter. The longer Russian line now closed around the Swedes, trapping and attacking them from three sides. Under this pressure, the Swedish charge faltered, and the battle was transformed into a slaughter.

Outcomes

• (1) The Battle of Poltava marked the end of the Swedish Empire and of Sweden’s role as a great military power. The state that had looked poised to establish a northern empire under a succession of dynamic leaders was now reduced to a relatively minor polity.
• (2) Conversely, Poltava also marked the rise of Russia as an important international power that would continue to play a major role in European politics for the next three centuries. The battle solidified Peter’s position, and enabled him to complete his process of modernizing Russia and incorporating it into the European economic and political sphere.

Conclusion

The Battle of Poltava concluded one of the most pivotal military confrontations of the early 18th century, decisively altering the balance of power in Europe. With Russia’s victory, Tsar Peter the Great cemented his nation’s rise as a dominant force, ushering in an era of Russian expansion and modernization. Conversely, the defeat marked the beginning of the end for the Swedish Empire, reducing its influence and reshaping the political landscape of Northern and Eastern Europe. The battle is remembered not only for its immediate impact but also for its lasting significance in shaping the future of the continent.

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